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Barlow v. Nevada 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 25 (April 14, 2022)1
Clarification on Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances:
The Court clarified the district court’s reasoning that if the jury failed to reach a
unanimous decision as to the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances the result is
a hung jury.
Summary
Kenneth Barlow was found guilty of multiple charges by a jury and sentenced to death
for murdering two people. During the guilt phase of the trial, the State provided overwhelming
evidence that Barlow had broken into the victims’ apartment and shot each of them multiple
times. Barlow was prohibited by the district court from arguing during the penalty phase that if a
single juror determines that there are mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the
aggravating circumstance that the death penalty is no longer an option and the jury must then
consider imposing a sentence other than death. The Court clarified that when a jury cannot reach
a unanimous decision as to the weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the
jury cannot impose a death sentence but must consider other sentencing options. The Court
concluded that the district court abused its discretion by prohibiting Barlow’s argument. The
Court concluded that Barlow was deprived of a fair penalty hearing for this error and others
described within the case. No relief was warranted based on Barlow’s claims in the guilt phase.
The Court affirmed the judgment of conviction in part, reversed it in part, and remanded for a
new penalty hearing.
Facts and Procedural History
Keith Barlow had a stormy romantic relationship with Danielle Woods. Woods was also
in a relationship with Donnie Cobb. On February 1, 2013, Barlow ran into Woods’ niece,
Tamara Herron. Barlow asked if she knew where Danielle Woods was at the time. Herron stated
that Barlow appeared angry, told her he was tired of the pair’s “games” and knew Danielle
Woods was with Donnie Cobb. Several days later he encountered the pair at a convenience store.
After an altercation at the store in which Barlow threatened Cobb with a firearm, Barlow
threatened that he would “be back.” Two hours later, Barlow shot Cobbs and Woods to death at
Cobb’s apartment. Barlow was charged with home invasion while in possession of a firearm,
burglary while in possession of a firearm, assault with the use of a deadly weapon, and two
counts of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. The state filed a notice of intent
to seek the death penalty for both murders. This appeal followed after the jury sentenced Barlow
to death.
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Discussion
Penalty phase claims
The primary issues addressed in this opinion concern the penalty phase of the trial. The
issues were limitations placed on Barlow’s penalty phase argument, prosecutorial misconduct,
the great-risk-of-death aggravating circumstance, and cumulative error. The Court focused first
on trial phase and then on the guilt-phase claims.
Limitation of Barlow’s penalty-phase argument
Barlow relied on Evans and argued that the district court erred in prohibiting from
making an argument based on a portion of the capital instruction and that if at least one juror
decides that there are mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating
circumstances, he could not be sentenced to death and the jury must consider another
punishment.2 The state argues that despite Evans instruction saying the same thing, the district
court correctly prohibited the argument citing that a disagreement as to the weighing of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances would result in a hung jury such that the jury could not
consider any other punishment. If at least one juror finds the mitigating circumstances to
outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the jury cannot impose the death penalty and must look
to other sentences. The Court therefore concluded that the district court abused its discretion in
not allowing Barlow to make that argument to the jury. Evans provides guidance not only on the
jury’s consideration of evidence during deliberations but also provides instruction to the jury of
steps that must be followed before imposing a sentence. 3
Should the jurors all agree and determine that are no mitigating circumstances sufficient
to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, they can impose a death sentence (but they are not
obligated to do so.) Conversely, if the jurors do not all agree that there are no mitigating
circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, they cannot impose a death
sentence. A hung jury only occurs when a jury cannot unanimously agree on the sentences to be
imposed. The district court therefore abused its discretion by not allowing Barlow to make this
argument regarding the weighing of determination. Further, the district court did correctly
instruct the jury before deliberations began and the jury unanimously found that the aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. While this error was considered
harmless it did contribute to the cumulative error during the penalty hearing.
Prosecutorial misconduct
Barlow argues that prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty phase warrants reversal.
At issue are remarks made by the prosecutor during trail and whether those remarks are
harmless. The context of those remarks is also reviewed. At issue is the sentence imposed for the
2
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killing of two victims with the reasoning being that had Barlow killed only Woods a life sentence
would have been appropriate but if that is the decision, “…what justice does Donnie Cobb get?”
The Court concluded that the prosecutor’s comments improperly “suggest that justice requires a
death sentence because the defendant killed more than one person.” The prosecutor further told
the jury that the State would respect whatever verdict they rendered. The Court concluded that
the error was harmless after considering the remark in context.
Great-risk-of-death-to-more-than-one-person aggravating circumstance
Barlow argues the above is invalid for two reasons: the State did not provide sufficient
notice and insufficient evidence supports it.
Inadequate notice of the State’s alternative theory
Stated plainly, “a defendant should not have to gather facts to deduce the State’s theory
for an aggravating circumstance, the supporting facts must be stated directly in the notice itself.”4
The State’s notice of intent to seek the death penalty alleged that Barlow knowingly created a
risk to more than one person based on the proximity of the victims to each other when he shot
them. Further, a greater risk occurred because a bullet went through a wall and out a window in
an adjoining apartment, and into a public area. The State never alleged that the path of the bullet
to prove aggravating circumstances.5, made no mention of the bullet entering a public area or
that other persons were in that area. The State improperly argued those facts in support of the
great-risk-of-death aggravating circumstance. The State alleged six aggravating circumstances
and only mentioned the public-area theory briefly when describing the evidence in aggravation.
The remarks wherefore were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. They did, however, contribute
to the cumulative error.6
Sufficiency of the evidence
NRS 200.033(3) provides that first-degree murder is aggravated if it “was committed by a
person who knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person by means of
weapon, device or course of action which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than
one person.” The Court has also determined that the greater-risk-of-death aggravating
circumstance also includes a “course of action” consisting of two intentional shootings closely
related in time and place.” The Legislature’s adoption of the multiple-murder aggravating
circumstance in 1993 modified the application. Such that for murders occurring committed after
October 1, 1993, the aggravator set forth in NRS 200.033(12) rather than the one in NRS
200.033(3) be applied to cases such as this one where the defendant’s course of action created a
great risk of death only to the murder victims. Aggravating circumstances should not have been
applied to this case. The Court concluded that the error in presenting the invalid aggravating
4
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circumstance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State proved five other aggravating
circumstances. The Court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that, absent the invalid
aggravating circumstance, the jury would still have found that the mitigating circumstances
would be insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
Cumulative error in the penalty phase
Barlow argues that the while the errors may be harmless individually, their cumulative
impact during the penalty phase warrants relief. Generally, the nature and number of errors is
assessed along with the evidence presented, and the gravity of the consequences a defendant
faces.7 The Court determined that in light of the district court mistakenly prohibiting Barlow
from making a legally valid argument that appealed to the jurors’ ability to bestow mercy and in
conjunction with the prosecutor’s improper argument, that the likelihood exists that Barlow was
prejudiced. The Court reversed the judgment of conviction as to the death sentences and
remanded a new penalty hearing.
Guilt phase claims
Jury selection
Barlow argues that the jury selection process was unconstitutional based on the district
court limiting his questioning, denying his objection the State’s use of its peremptory challenges,
and denying his for-cause challenge. The Court noted no errors made by the district court after
reviewing the jury selection process.
Expert Testimony
Barlow argues that the district court erred by allowing an unqualified expert to testify
about firearms and toolmark identification. NRS 50.275 states that the witness must be qualified
to give specialized testimony, the testimony must be limited to the scope of the expert’s
knowledge and must help the jury.8 Further, whether the testimony of the expert witness is
admitted is within the district court’s discretion. The Court will not disturb that decision unless
there is a clear need to do so.9 The Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting expert testimony in this case.
Prosecutorial misconduct
Barlow contends that the prosecutor improperly argued that Barlow saved the final bullet
for the headshot to Woods because no evidence supported this. The Court agreed but found the
error harmless. The Court found that the State presented overwhelming evidence of Barlow’s
guilt including Barlow’s testimony, the discovery of the handgun in Barlow’s vehicle with his
fingerprint and DNA, and the expert testimony linking shell casings found at the scene with
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See Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1195, 196 P.3d 465, 481 (2008) (discussing cumulative error).
Hallmark v. Eldridge, 124 Nev. 492, 498, 189 P.3d 646, 650 (2008).
Mulder v. State, 116 Nev. 1, 12-13, 992 P.2d 845, 852 (2000).

Barlow’s handgun. The Court concluded that the comment did not have a substantial effect on
the guilt phase verdict.10 Barlow also took issue with a comment made by the prosecutor at the
end of the closing arguments noting that the prosecutor improperly commented on Barlow’s right
to remain silent.11 The Court concluded that Barlow has not shown plain error.12
Jury Instructions
Barlow argues that the district court erroneously instructed the jury on several matters.
First, Barlow contends that the burglarous-intent instruction unconstitutionally shifted the burden
of proof allowing a finding of guilt without the State proving intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court disagreed because the instructions accurately reflect NRS 205.065. Second, Barlow
contends that the state-of-mind and intent-to-kill instructions misled the jury. The State is not
required to present direct evidence of state-of-mind and the jury may infer Barlow’s state of
mind to include use of a deadly weapon. The Court discerned no error.13
Cumulative error in the guilt phase
Barlow argues that cumulative error during the guilt phase warrants relief. The Court
discerned only one error and found nothing to cumulate.14
Conclusion
The Court considered all of Barlow’s guilt claims and concluded that no relief is
warranted as to the guilt phase. The Court affirmed the judgment of conviction in part. Because
of the error during the penalty phase of trial, the Court reversed the judgement of conviction as to
the death sentences for first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and remanded for a
new penalty hearing.
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